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A) INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment is one issue in the category of "invisible" wrongs in society, whose 
actual existence is doubted by some, and for which regulation has traditionally been very 
limited, "[T]he Court System as a whole does not have a tradition of protecting women's 
rights and understanding specifically gender harms, whether for sexual assault, domestic 
violence or sexual harassment."' 
The "male voice"2 of our legal system has resulted in a perceptible reluctance to regulate 
problems and harms primarily faced by women. Marital rape, which was not a crime 
until 1986, 3 is a prime example. 
In the past decade, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA), the Human Rights Act 
1993 (HRA), and the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (DV A) have been enacted. These 
Acts contain provisions on sexual harassment. The DV A provisions are confined to 
persons in a domestic relationship.4 The ECA provisions have been praised as "the best 
in the world",5 but are limited to sexual harassment occurring in employment situations. 
It is also arguable that the law's past failure to regulate sexual harassment means that only 
conservative, nominally effective provisions have ever been implemented. Therefore, 
even the best provisions in the world may be unsatisfactory. 6 The HRA sexual 
1 C Baylis "The Appropriateness of Conciliation / Mediation for Sexual Harassment Complaints in New 
Zealand" (1997) 27 VUWLR 585,597. 
2 See C Gilligan In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women 's Development (Harvard 
University Press, Massachusetts, I 982). 
3 Crimes Act 1961 s 128(2). 
4 The section 4 definition of "domestic relationship" includes partners, family members, persons ordinarily 
sharing a household, and persons in a close personal relationship. 
5 W Davis A Feminist Perspective on Sexual Harassment in Employment Law in New Zealand (Monograph 
No 3, New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research, Wellington, 1994) 28. 
6 Davis, above n 5. Although the author praises the ECA provisions, she is critical of their implementation. 
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harassment clause has a wider scope than the ECA and DV A provisions,7 but the claimant 
must still show that the harassment was executed in one of eight specified contexts. 8 
The Harassment Act 1997 was enacted primarily because of a perceived need to introduce 
an offence of stalking.9 The Act does not identify sexual harassment as a distinct offence. 
Indeed, the term "sexual harassment" is not specified at all. Sexual harassment 
proceedings under the Act must therefore be framed within the provisions which were 
fundamentally designed to encompass "ordinary" harassment or stalking. 
It is my belief that the Harassment Act should adequately address all types of harassment. 
Sexual harassment provisions should not be confined to employment and domestic 
violence settings. I advocate the enactment of general provisions for sexual harassment 
occurnng m any setting, and criminal as well as civil liability is needed for sexual 
harassment to be recognised as a sexual crime; a real societal harm. 
I believe that it is crucial to recognise and name sexual harassment as a distinct class of 
harassment. It should not be squashed into the elements of "ordinary" harassment and 
stalking. Sexual harassment must be recognised as unacceptable behaviour in its own 
right. 
There is also a need to expand popular notions of what constitutes sexual harassment. 
Sexual harassment is distinguishable from "ordinary" harassment, which is acting to 
"trouble or annoy [ another person] continually or repeatedly" .10 While sexual harassment 
7 Human Rights Act 1993 s 62. 
8 These contexts are specified in section 62(3), and include employment, training, education, participation 
in a partnership, membership of an association, access to a qualification, and access to places, vehicles, 
facilities, goods, services and accommodation. These contexts would probably not cover sexual 
harassment perpetrated by a stranger in a public street, for example. 
9 (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5729-5746. 
10 One definition of "harass" in D Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1995) 618. Note also that there is no definition of "sexually harass", which reinforces the 
invisibility of sexual harassment. 
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involves such annoyance, I believe that it is fundamentally different in its objectification 
of the victim as a sexual object. Sexual harassment, in its usual form of a male harassing 
a female, reinforces the gender power differential entrenched in our patriarchal society. 
The annoyance is experienced from the view of a woman who is made to feel biologically 
inferior and powerless, rather than from the view of a person of equal rank. 
11 
Daily examples of sexual harassment include being subjected to whistles and car horn 
toots when walking down the street, and receiving derogatory personal comments and 
proposals which are yelled from a construction site or across a public bar. Such examples 
are so commonplace in our society that most people probably think that a woman should 
expect to experience them, and is perhaps asking for them, if she wears a short skirt or 
knee-high boots, for example. While some women feel flattered or are able to ignore 
such attention, the self-consciousness and humiliation it engenders in others should not 
have to be expected or tolerated. The prevalence of sexual harassment is simply no 
excuse for its perpetration. 
11 See my subsequent discussion of sexual harassment as a power issue, under "Crim in al Harassment" on 
page 11. 
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B) WHY THE HARASSMENT ACT SHOULD EN COMP ASS 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
1) The Invisibility of Women's Harms 
5 
The law's traditional distinction between the regulated public sphere (the business world) 
and the unregulated private sphere (the home and family) meant that women, who usually 
resided in the private sphere, were invisible to the law. "The invisibility of women 
masked the absence of women's rights."12 The male-dominated legislature and judiciary 
saw no need to regulate outside their own sphere, and women's concerns were therefore 
not heard. Indeed, a woman in the nineteenth century had few individual rights and was 
seen as "one flesh" with her husband, "whose every whim - violent or sexual - could be 
forced upon her". 13 This is shown in English law where, until 1882, a husband was the 
sole owner and manager of his wife's previously held property, and, until 1992, marital 
rape did not legally exist, "for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife 
hath given herself up in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract."
14 Another 
reason for the lack of legal recognition of harms faced by women is the law's traditional 
emphasis on physical evidence of harm, for which there is often none.
15 
The public and private spheres are no longer so distinct. Women are often employed in 
the public arena, and the State increasingly regulates the family in matters such as 
domestic violence and social security. While our laws have responded to violence against 
women, these laws "are characterized by a silent male referent that masks rather than 
12 H Barnett Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London, 1998) 65. 
13 Barnett, above n 12, 61. 
14 M Hale (Sir) The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736) (London Professional Books, London, 1971) 
eh 58, 629. 
15 See R Hunter "Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs Feminist Reforms" (1996) 19 Harvard 
Women's Law Journal 127, 157. 
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eliminates sexual hierarchy and inequality". 16 That is, laws which seek to eliminate and 
punish violence against women are problematic because the predominantly "male voice" 
of the judiciary struggles to understand an almost uniquely female experience. The legal 
claim of sexual harassment is probably the first time women have defined women's 
injuries. 17 "[T]he idea that the law should see it the way its victims see it ... is definitely 
a feminist invention." 18 
Our culture is still fairly unreceptive to both the making and rece1vmg of sexual 
harassment claims. "Women, after all, are the tension managers in our society, so it goes 
against deeply ingrained behaviour for them to challenge this form of male behaviour, 
particularly when it is presented as 'friendly' and 'harmless' ."
19 
I believe that the Harassment Act's failure to name sexual harassment will mean that 
claims under the Act will be viewed as unisex harms and adjudicated through the 
objective and rational perspective of the "male voice". In contrast, naming sexual 
harassment would imply that the male-dominated judiciary must acknowledge the 
necessity of a more open mind in trying to understand an essentially female harm. In this 
way, it would represent a step towards recognising the patriarchy inherent in our culture 
and legal system:20 
Labelling sexual harassment transforms the private and personal experiences into a 
general problem for working women in a patriarchal society. The term sexual 
harassment enables women to see these personal encounters as part of an 
institutionalized system of male domination and thereby to struggle against it[.] 
16 E Grauerholz & M Koralewski Sexual Coercion: A Sourcebook on its Nature, Causes and Prevention 
(Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1991) 170. 
17 See C MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1987). 
18 MacKinnon, above n 17, I 03 . 
19 E Wilson What is to be done about Violence Against Women? (Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex, 1983) 
178. 
20 Grauerholz & Koralewski, above n 16, 175. 
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Naming sexual harassment would also publicly acknowledge the seriousness and 
unacceptability of sexual harassment. "Especially when you are part of a subordinated 
group, your own definition of your injuries is powerfully shaped by your assessment of 
whether you could get anyone to do anything about it, including anything official."
21 
This would serve to both send a powerful message of unacceptability and deterrence to 
potential sexual harassers and empower victims by validating their feelings of being 
wronged. 
It needs to be recognised that sexual harassment can occur outside employment and 
domestic situations. Many cases will therefore not be covered by the ECA or DV A. 
Furthermore, there are acknowledged problems in the application of the mediation 
provisions in the HRA and the ECA to sexual harassment cases. 
22 Women are often 
disadvantaged through mediation because of their weaker bargaining power, the control 
of the mediator and lawyers, and the mandatory nature of some mediation provisions. 
23 
The State needs to take responsibility to ensure that all victims of sexual harassment have 
adequate legal protection and remedies. 
21 MacKinnon, above n 17, 105. 
22 Human Rights Act 1993 s 81 and the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ss 78, 80(2) and 88(2). See 
Baylis, above n 1, 585-620. 
23 See H Dixon Counselling, Mediation, in the Family Court (LLB[Hons] Legal Research & Writing 
Requirement, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994). 
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2) Aim of Act to Provide Adequate Protection For All Harassment Victims 
One of the objects of the Harassment Act is to "[e]nsur[e] that there is adequate legal 
protection for all victims of harassment."24 Section 6(2)(b) provides that one of the ways 
in which the Act aims to achieve its objects is to "[e]mpowe[r] the Court to make orders 
to protect victims of harassment who are not covered by domestic violence legislation". 
All victims of harassment who are not protected by domestic violence legislation must 
therefore have access to the Court' s protection for the Act's object to be achieved. Sexual 
harassment, as a distinct class of harassment, must be adequately covered by the Act. 
The specification of sexual harassment as a separate offence would enable the Act's 
protection provisions to readily extend to sexual harassment victims. Without such a 
specification, the Court may be reluctant to invoke the protection mechanisms in the Act 
in sexual harassment cases. 
Women must also have access to the definitional process of their injuries before effective 
sanctions can be put in place. "Feminism seeks to empower women on our own terms ... 
[ w ]e seek not only to be valued as who we are, but to have access to the process of the 
definition of value itself. "25 
24 Harassment Act 1997 s 6(1)(b). 
25 MacKinnon, above n 17, 22. 
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3) Aim of Act to Criminalise Serious Types of Harassment 
Section 6(2)(a) states that one of the ways in which the Act aims to achieve its objects is 
by "[m]aking the most serious types of harassment criminal offences". 
The effects of sexual harassment on a victim can be just as serious as the effects of 
"ordinary" harassment. I would go so far as to argue that sexual harassment may, in fact, 
be more harmful, as unwelcome sexual behaviour often has undertones of a potentially 
imminent sexual assault. Therefore, the criminalisation of sexual harassment is just as 
warranted as that of "ordinary" harassment or stalking. 
However, the Act's failure to name sexual harassment as a distinct offence means that 
criminal sexual harassment actions must be framed within the generic provision in section 
8. This section was primarily designed to criminalise stalking or "ordinary" harassment. 
The Act simply "glosses over" the fact that much "traditional" harassment and stalking 
involves a sexual element, as if sexual harassment is incidental to the stalking, rather than 
a serious offence in its own right. This implies that the legislature believes that the 
criminalisation of sexual harassment is only warranted as one of "the most serious types 
of harassment" if it occurs within stalking or "ordinary" harassment behaviour. Sexual 
harassment must be named as a distinct offence before it will ever be seen as a sexual 
cnme. 
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4) Aim of Act to Provide Effective Sanctions 
Under section 6(2)(c), the Act aims to achieve its objects by "[p]roviding effective 
sanctions for breaches of the criminal and civil law relating to harassment." The Act 
therefore aims to be an avenue for all harassment victims to obtain effective remedies. 
The use of the word "sanctions" also indicates that punishment of all perpetrators of 
harassment is available under the Act. 
I believe that the seriousness of sexual harassment must be recognised before effective 
sanctions can be provided. I would argue that the legal remedy of restraining orders fails 
to demonstrate that harassment is a serious problem and its perpetrators deserve 
punishment. This failure is particularly marked in relation to sexual harassment because 
of its prevalence in society. Other civil and criminal remedies must be available under 
the Act for effective sanctions to be accessible for victims of sexual harassment. 
10 
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C) PROBLEMS WITH THE HARASSMENT ACT IN ENCOMPASSING 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
11 
The boundaries between sexual harassment and "ordinary" harassment are not always 
clearly defined. A lot of sexual harassment will implicitly be covered by the Harassment 
Act. This will be the case when a perpetrator of stalking or "ordinary" harassment is 
sexually motivated or incidentally performs acts of a sexual nature. Sexual harassment 
will also come under the Act if it is part of a pattern of behaviour which causes the victim 
to fear for her or his safety, and would cause a reasonable person in the victim's 
circumstances to fear for her or his safety, as this will constitute a specified act of 
harassment under section 4(1)(f). 
However, I do not believe that most acts of sexual harassment cause the victim to fear for 
her or his safety, as specified in the Act. Likewise, sexual harassment does not usually 
occur within a pattern of stalking behaviour. I believe that the Act therefore fails to 
adequately include sexual harassment victims within its protective ambit. 
1) Requirement of Repetition of Harassment 
"Harassment" is defined as26 
a pattern of behaviour that is directed against that other person, being a pattern of 
behaviour that includes doing any specified act to the other person on at least 2 separate 
occasions within a period of 12 months . 
This requirement of repetition of behaviour is common among New Zealand statutory 
provisions on sexual harassment. 27 The message appears to be that a one-off incident of 
26 Harassment Act 1997 s 3(1). 
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sexual harassment must be endured, as if it is not something for the courts to bother with, 
and, indeed, is perhaps something a person should expect or at least tolerate in society. 
This requirement of a repetition within twelve months implicitly condones an annual 
perpetration of sexual harassment. There is no protection for a person who is sexually 
harassed every year at a Christmas party, for example. 
This requirement may have been introduced in such provisions for reasons such as a 
desire to lighten caseloads, or a belief by male legislators that two incidents of sexual 
harassment are needed to "overstep the mark". However, I believe that sexual 
harassment is never trivial nor acceptable. 
I believe that the requirement of a pattern of behaviour is more appropriate for a stalking 
offence than for a sexual harassment offence.28 "Ordinary" harassment, by definition,29 
involves a pattern of harassing behaviour, which I do not believe so instinctively attaches 
to the concept of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment usually involves a more direct, 
personal attack than stalking, and is more likely to entail a physical invasion of the 
victim's bodily integrity. A person is likely to immediately know when she or he is being 
sexually harassed. However, a person may initially be unsure if the actions of an alleged 
stalker, such as loitering near or watching,30 are actually connected to her or him. 
One act of sexual harassment should be enough to warrant the victim' s future protection 
from a repetition of such an incident. One act could doubtlessly suffice to frighten the 
27 Employment Contracts Act 1991 s 29(l)(b)(ii) and the Human Rights Act 1993 s 62(2)(b). Note though 
that the requirement of repetition in both these provisions can be subverted by the harassment being "of 
such a significant nature that it has a detrimental effect" on certain matters relating to the applicant. 
28 This appears to be evidenced by the option to subvert the repetition requirement in the specific sexual 
harassment provisions in the ECA and the HRA (as opposed to the general harassment provisions in the 
Harassment Act) . See above, n 27. 
29 Thompson, above n 10. 
30 Harassment Act 1997 s 4(l)(a). 
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victim or make her or him feel too uncomfortable to ever go near the perpetrator again. A 
victim of one incident of sexual harassment may foresee a potentially imminent sexual 
assault but is unable to seek protection unless the perpetrator repeats such harassment 
within twelve months. 
An abolition of the repetition requirement in the Harassment Act would go further than 
the ECA and the HRA by publicly declaring that any event of sexual harassment need not 
be tolerated in this day and age. 31 However, it is foreseeable that, in practice, a judge may 
look for repetition if the act is seen as ambiguous as to whether or not it constitutes sexual 
harassment. This would diminish the effectiveness of the provision by perpetuating male 
notions of objectivity rather than relying on women's subjective responses to sexual 
harassment. One must hope that such judicial discretion will be discouraged by the 
elimination of all references to repetition. 
2) "Specified Acts" 
The meaning of "specified act" in section 4 includes examples of behaviour, such as 
watching, following, and interfering with property, which clearly seem to be designed to 
cover traditional stalking behaviour. I believe that acts of sexual harassment, examples of 
which are touching, making offensive comments, and sexually propositioning a person, 
are often very different from acts of stalking and are not encapsulated in the section 4 
examples of a specified act. 
Several acts in section 4(1), especially those in subsections (l)(a), (l)(b) and (l)(c), could 
not ordinarily constitute sexual harassment. Such acts are watching, loitering near, 
hindering access to a place and interfering with property. However, following, stopping 
and accosting are specified acts which could constitute sexual harassment under these 
31 The sexual harassment would not have to come within a specific exception, such as those in the ECA and 
HRA, in order to avoid the repetition requirement. See above, n 27. 
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subsections. The g1vmg of offensive material of a sexual nature may also constitute 
sexual harassment, and would be a specified act under subsection (1 )( e ). 
If "making contact" in subsection (l)(d) can include physical contact of a sexual nature, 
this can encompass some types of sexual harassment. However, the examples given of 
making contact "by telephone [or] correspondence" indicate that this subsection refers to 
communication. Such communication could be of a sexual nature, such as the displaying 
of pornographic material or the making of sexual remarks over the telephone, and could 
constitute sexual harassment. 
Sexual harassment which is serious enough to cause a person to reasonably fear for her or 
his safety would also constitute a specified act under subsection (1 )(f). However, I 
believe that this is insupportable as a threshold which a victim of sexual harassment must 
meet before she or he can seek protection via a restraining order. I believe that restraining 
orders should also be obtainable by a person who merely does not want to put up with 
future sexual harassment from a perpetrator. 
This high threshold also implies that sexual harassment does not cause harm to a victim 
unless she or he is at the point of reasonably fearing for her or his safety. Typical 
examples of sexual harassment, such as being subjected to sexual remarks while passing a 
construction site, would not usually invoke fear for one's safety, but may cause 
humiliation and a reduction in confidence. The State should recognise that such victims 
of sexual harassment need to be granted some relief, because these feelings are damaging 
to a person's dignity and self-esteem. 
This threshold is made even higher by concerns regarding the male-dominated judiciary 
applying concepts of reasonableness to a predominantly female experience. It is more 
likely that a male judge will relate to the harasser's position, as most perpetrators are 
male, than to the victim's position, as most victims are female. "[A]nyone dealing with 
14 
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this ( or any other) issue will bring to it a particularized perspective, so that a 'neutral' 
assessment is simply not possible."32 
This reasonableness standard also suggests that the male-dominated judiciary will 
interpret the term "safety" with respect to the danger that objectively exists, and will not 
pay enough regard to a female victim's subjective belief about her own vulnerability. 
"Even if a woman does not 'rationally' think that this man would force sex on her, rape 
her, there is the possibility, the fear of that."33 
In summary, acts of sexual harassment can fit within the examples of specified acts in 
section 4. However, it seems to pose a bit of a challenge to fit acts such as touching, 
grabbing, propositioning, and making remarks and innuendos into "making contact with 
that person" in section 4(1 )( d). The apparent necessity of stretching the meaning of this 
provision to include sexual harassment indicates that the Act was really not designed to 
cover sexual harassment. It appears that some modification of the Act is required to 
properly recognise sexual harassment as an unacceptable, distinct offence. 
32 E Wall (ed) Sexual Harassment: Confrontations and Decisions (Prometheus Books, New York, 1992) 
235 . 
33 Baylis, above n 1, 596. 
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3) Criminal Harassment 
The provision for criminal harassment reqmres an offender to intend to cause, or be 
reckless about causing, the victim to reasonably fear for her or his safety.34 
The Harassment Act was part of a package of reforms relating to gang-related criminal 
activity.35 Members of Parliament were concerned about incidents of gang members 
intimidating, or encouraging someone else to intimidate, prosecution witnesses for their 
trials. 36 Therefore, the criminal harassment provision appears to be modelled on this kind 
of calculative perpetrator of stalking or "ordinary" harassment who intends to frighten a 
potential witness into not testifying. 
Although there is usually an element of power in all types of harassment, I believe that 
the subjective motives of stalkers are often very different from those of sexual harassers. 
While a stalker often aims to frighten her or his victim, a person who sexually harasses 
usually intends to obtain sexual gratification.37 However, all sexual harassment occurs 
within a background of established patriarchy and inherent power imbalance. "Power 
inequality is seen as the root of all forms of discrimination and violence directed at 
women; it is the result of and represents an attempt to maintain that imbalance."38 Thus 
sexual harassment further entrenches the objectification of women in our patriarchal 
society, and this objectification itself may provide a basis for a man to believe that he can 
34 Harassment Act 1997 s 8. 
35 Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill 1996, No 215-1. 
36 NZPD, above n 9. 
37 M Studd "Sexual Harassment" in D Buss & N Malamuth (eds) Sex, Power, Conflict: Evolutionary and 
Feminist Perspectives (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 54. The researchers in this chapter 
sampled the 92 published case reports in Canada from 1980 to 1989 which involved a male harasser and a 
female victim. Data was collected on the motivation of the harasser in each case, which involved 
combining the stated goal of the harasser described in the legal testimony and the behavioural means used 
to achieve that goal. 
38 Grauerholz & Koralewski, above n 16, 62. 
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get away with sexual harassment. However, this is distinct from the harasser's actual 
conscious motive to sexually harass in the first place: "[S]exual access and not the 
exercise of power is the ultimate goal ... however, it is clear that power may often be 
used as a means to achieve sexual goals. "39 
As power is often not the primary motive of sexual harassment, the judiciary is more 
likely to find that the perpetrator's intention was to gain sexual access rather than to cause 
fear for personal safety. Similarly, a court is likely to find that there was no recklessness 
because the risk of causing this fear for personal safety may not have been consciously 
considered. In failing to take account of the generally different motives of stalkers and 
sexual harassers, the criminalisation provision is effectively confined to "ordinary" 
harassment or stalking. 
I would argue that a restriction of the victim's liberty is a more likely consequence of 
sexual harassment than a fear for personal safety. I believe that a court could more easily 
find that a sexual harasser was reckless as to causing a restriction of the victim's liberty. 
A refused sexual proposition usually causes awkwardness, and sexual harassment, by 
going one step further, could certainly cause a victim's liberty to be subsequently 
restricted in the conscious avoidance of her or his harasser. 
39 Studd, above n 37, 68-69. Sexual harassment involving a goal of sexual access and the overt exercise of 
power comprised 43 .5% of cases. Sexual harassment involving a goal of sexual access without the overt 
exercise of power comprised 38% of cases. Sexual harassment involving neither overt sexual demands nor 
overt power manifestations comprised 18.5% of cases. 
17 
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4) Effective Sanctions 
I believe that denunciation is the main reason why we need to substantively punish sexual 
harassers. The principle of denunciation justifies a heavier sanction or penalty because it 
"increase[s] other people's moral disapproval of the offence, or respect for the 
prohibitions of the criminal law, by means of the message conveyed by the severity of the 
sentence".40 I believe that this is especially important for misunderstood offences like 
sexual harassment. 
The theory of retribution also provides a reason for the need to really sanction offenders. 
The real harm that sexual harassment can cause justifies the perpetrator's punishment:4 1 
It is unfair that the offender should be allowed to 'get away with' that advantage, and it is 
therefore right that he should be subjected to a disadvantage so as to cancel out (at least 
symbolically) his ill-gotten gain. 
A lack of effective punishment for sexual harassment "adds insult to injury" for the 
victim: "not to penalise it seems to add to the infringement."42 
Section 16 outlines a court's power to make a restraining order, which is the sole remedy 
for civil harassment under the Act. The requirement in subsection (l)(c) that "[t]he 
making of an order is necessary to protect the applicant from further harassment" shows 
that the focus of the Act's sole civil harassment remedy is on protecting the victim, but 
not punishing the offender. "Protection orders are not an exercise in the allocation of 
blame or reward ... [t]he purpose is to protect people who are in need of protection, for 
whatever reason. "43 
40 N Walker Sentencing: Theory law & Practice (Butterworths, London, 1985) 113. 
41 A Ashworth Sentencing & Penal Policy (Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, London, 1983) 18. 
42 Walker, above n 40, 110. 
43 New Zealand Law Society Seminar Domestic Violence (Wellington, 1993) 56. 
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It seems likely that a case of sexual harassment will be confined to the civil sphere 
because it is unable to fulfil the stringent requirements for criminal harassment. 
Therefore, it appears almost impossible to punish the perpetrator and satisfy the object of 
section 6(2)( c) in relation to sexual harassment. 
As sexual harassment is so prevalent in society, while stalking appears to be 
comparatively rare, I believe that accessible sanctions are required to demonstrate that 
sexual harassment will not be tolerated in today's environment of supposed liberty and 
equality. If sexual harassment is confined to the civil sphere under the Act, there will be 
no real discouragement to sexually harass, as a restraining order is the harshest "penalty" 
which can be imposed. The State's message is that, while such behaviour will be 
disallowed for a certain period of time,44 the sexual harassment which has already 
occurred is not deemed to sufficiently offend societal morals to warrant punishment and 
censure. 
In many cases, restraining orders are also ineffective m protecting victims. In the 
domestic violence arena, it has been recognised that45 
[ v ]iolent men and their lawyers have developed strategies for reducing the effectiveness of 
protection orders and are well aware that the consequences of breaching orders are usually 
minimal . .. [a]s a result women increasingly see protection orders as being ineffective. 
I believe that provision should be made in the Act for compensatory damages for civil 
sexual harassment. The confinement of civil remedies to restraining orders under the Act 
does not provide the means for effective civil sanctions, and arguably disadvantages the 
victim more than the perpetrator, in terms of the time and money required to file a claim. 
44 Section 21 provides that a restraining order continues in force for one year, in the absence of a discharge 
under section 23 or a direction by the Court that the order is to be in force for a specified period that the 
Court considers necessary to protect the applicant from further harassment. 
45 New Zealand Law Society Seminar, above n 43, 31. 
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Restraining orders are also disempowering because victims must apply for protection 
from the State rather than for a recognition of their rights and suffering in an award of 
compensation. "[M]ale supremacy is a protection racket. It keeps you dependent on the 
very people who brutalize you so you will keep needing their protection. "46 
The fact that it would be straining a judge's interpretative skills to fit most cases of sexual 
harassment within the criminal harassment provision in section 8, coupled with the 
difficulties which may occur when the male-dominated judiciary attempts to apply 
requirements of reasonableness47 to a problem traditionally faced by women, justifies the 
conclusion that the Harassment Act does not sufficiently address sexual harassment or 
achieve its objects in relation to sexual harassment. 
46 MacKinnon, above n 17, 31 . 
47 Harassment Act 1997 ss 4(l)(f), 4(2)(c), 8(1), 16(1)(b), 18(2)(b) and 20(1 ). 
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D) PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE HARASSMENT ACT TO ADEOUATEL Y 
ADDRESS SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
There is a lack of judicial and public understanding of the senousness of sexual 
harassment and the patriarchy which gives rise to it. Sexual harassment is also much 
more pervasive in society than stalking. In view of these differences, I believe that some 
separate provisions need to be enacted for sexual harassment to be properly adjudicated as 
a distinct offence under the Harassment Act. 
1) Section 3A - Separate Meaning of "Sexual Harassment" 
A separate definition of "sexual harassment" would serve two purposes. Firstly, it would 
signify that sexual harassment is a separate gendered harm which cannot adequately be 
subsumed within "ordinary" harassment. In doing so, it would imply that sexual 
harassment involves a different kind of inquiry and open-minded adjudication, as it is an 
alien experience to most of the predominantly male judiciary. It would raise awareness of 
"women's issues" and influence societal norms by demonstrating the legal (and social) 
unacceptability of sexual harassment. 
Secondly, it could be drafted to exclude the requirement of a pattern of behaviour for 
sexual harassment. This would demonstrate the unacceptability of even one act of sexual 
harassment. Despite the prevalence of sexual harassment in daily life, it is not something 
that should have to be tolerated once before any legal action can be taken. "If the 
pervasiveness of an abuse makes it nonactionable, no inequality sufficiently 
institutionalized to merit a law against it would be actionable."48 
48 MacKinnon, above n 17, 115. 
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The meaning of "sexual harassment" in section 3A could therefore be the performing of 
any specified act in relation to sexual harassment. 
2) Section 4A - Meaning of "Specified Act" in Relation to Sexual Harassment 
The requirement for sexual harassment to fit within the specified acts in section 4 means 
that there are risks of judicial discretion and bias, both in trying to fit an act within the list 
and in not recognising sexual harassment as a different kind of inquiry. A separate list of 
specified acts is required to demonstrate the need for a different investigation and a 
distinct approach to sexual harassment as a separate gendered harm. 
The existing list of specified acts in section 4 was not drafted with sexual harassment in 
mind. Sexual harassment, as a separate harm, should therefore not have to fit within this 
list in order to be recognised. A separate list of acts of sexual harassment would reduce 
the possibility of judicial discretion and help focus the inquiry. 
Specified acts of sexual harassment include physical, psychological and verbal 
harassment of a sexual nature. Physical harassment of a sexual nature involves hugging, 
grabbing, kissing or touching. Psychological sexual harassment includes sexual 
propositions and hints. Verbal sexual harassment includes sexual remarks, jokes, 
innuendos, insults, and the displaying of offensive sexual material. This separate list 
could clearly cover an incident of brushing against a person, for example, whereas it is 
not clearly covered by the existing list of specified acts in section 4. 
A general provision similar to section 4(1)(f) could be tailored around a broad definition 
of sexual harassment. I believe that the Harassment Act should go further than the HRA, 
ECA and DV A, by completely eliminating any reference to reasonableness. Sexual 
harassment, as a gendered harm, is about how a victim is made to subjectively feel. The 
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legislature cannot truly acknowledge the depth of this misunderstood offence by 
artificially superimposing notions of objectivity. This would result in adjudication 
through the "male voice", thus failing to achieve justice for women and defeating the 
purpose of sexual harassment provisions. 
Yet it is arguable that a reasonable woman standard would usually be applied because 
sexual harassment is a gendered harm. This would make it easier for the "female voice" 
to be heard. However, a reasonable woman standard still imparts an objective enquiry, 
which is less consistent with the "female voice" than the "male voice" approach. 
The general provision should therefore cover acts or remarks of a sexual nature which 
cause the plaintiff to feel humiliated, uncomfortable, or that her or his personal dignity is 
undermined. 
This provision would exhibit a lower threshold than the requirement of fearing for one's 
safety in section 4(1)(±). This lower threshold would make the provision receptive to 
many more sexual harassment claims and demonstrate the unacceptability of all harms 
caused by sexual harassment. 
3) Provision for Compensatory Damages for Civil Sexual Harassment 
Complainants who do not attain the criminal sexual harassment standard need a further 
option than a restraining order, for "effective sanctions"49 to be obtainable. The 
availability of compensatory damages under the Act would provide a greater deterrent to 
potential sexual harassers and demonstrate that harms occasioned by sexual harassment 
will be rightly recognised. Compensatory damages would actually serve to punish an 
49 Harassment Act 1997 s 6(2)(c). 
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offender for the sexual harassment which has already occurred, whereas restraining orders 
only seek to prevent sexual harassment from occurring in a finite future period. 
Compensatory damages would also serve to empower the victim by enforcing her or his 
rights as an equal citizen, rather than confirming the victim's vulnerability by granting 
her or him finite protection under a restraining order. 
Compensatory damages 1s also a supenor remedy to mediation m sexual harassment 
cases: 50 
[A] compromise-oriented settlement process, even if it is facilitated ... may not be 
appropriate to those disputes in which there is a significant power differential between the 
parties . .. [i]n this situation empowerment is likely to become a one-sided phenomenon, 
leaving the complainant potentially dissatisfied, manipulated and vulnerable. 
The very essence of mediation is compromise, which is inconsistent with the recognition 
of a clear breach of a victim's rights. It is unjust to require sexual harassment victims to 
not only endure the recounting of their experiences in front of their perpetrators but to be 
required to concede part of their claims through this negotiation process. This 
demonstrates the lack of understanding of the seriousness of sexual harassment by the 
legal system: 51 
To be expected to act co-operatively towards any mutually beneficial outcome is not 
realistic, feasible or desirable. The message given to the complainant when asked to 
conciliate, even on a remedy, in sexual harassment cases is that the behaviour is not 
unequivocally unacceptable . 
The lack of public education regarding the seriousness of sexual harassment means that 
mediators may well introduce prejudices and myths into the mediation process. Myths 
50 Baylis, above n I , 595 . 
51 Baylis, above n I, 615. 
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about the harassment of women by men include victim masochism (she enjoys or wants 
it), victim precipitation (she invited it), and the acts not really being harmful (he did not 
physically hurt her). 52 A formal court procedure is more likely to provide safeguards 
against such prejudices, such as through rules of evidence. 
4) Section SA - Criminal Sexual Harassment 
I. Appropriateness of the Criminalisation of Sexual Harassment 
Serious sexual harassment can constitute a criminal offence under several provisions in 
the Crimes Act. These provisions criminalise sexual violation,53 attempted sexual 
violation,54 inducing sexual connection by coercion,55 and indecently assaulting a woman 
or girl. 56 There is also an offence of threatened actions involving "detriment" to the 
victim,57 which is "aimed at certain cases of sexual harassment, and covers cases where V 
is induced to consent by threats".58 However, these provisions only apply to sexual 
harassment occurring in particular contexts. They also fail to name sexual harassment as 
a distinct offence which merits criminalisation. I advocate the need for a comprehensive 
provision which criminalises serious sexual harassment in any situation. 
52 See L Kelly Surviving Sexual Violence (University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1988). 
53 Crimes Act 1961 s 128. It is interesting to note that, since 1985, the mens rea requirement for this 
offence is objective recklessness. This covers an offender who does not even contemplate that the victim 
may not be consenting to the sexual act. 
54 Crimes Act 1961 s 129. 
55 Crimes Act 1961 s 129A. 
56 Crimes Act 1961 s 135. There is no reasonableness element to this offence, as an honest belief in 
consent constitutes a defence. 
57 Crimes Act 1961 s 129A(l)(c). 
58 A Simester & W Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brooker ' s Ltd, Wellington, 1998) 561. 
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Sexual harassment can cause severe harm to victims. "It can cause anorexia, anxiety, 
sleeplessness and, in extreme cases, nervous breakdown, and is always a source of 
stress."59 Despite the prevalence of sexual harassment in daily life, it can have a much 
more devastating effect on victims than may appear on the surface. A victim will often 
be scared to be near both the perpetrator and other people who are seen as potential 
perpetrators. A victim will worry about what she or he wears and says, and stay in 
perceived "safe" places, because of the fear that harassment will ensue. In short, a 
victim's liberty is restricted in a very real way. 
Sexual harassment also harms society by perpetuating the stereotype of women being 
weaker than and submissive to men. Through sexual harassment men wield a power of 
intimidation over women and restrict their freedom. This oppression of women must be 
recognised as a serious harm to society. 
The criminal law aims of punishment, denunciation and deterrence can only be satisfied if 
crimes are reported and laws are enforceable. The belief by a reasonable section of the 
community that sexual harassment is immoral will guard against enforcement and 
reporting problems. 
The fact that sexual harassment is somewhat prevalent in society indicates that it may not 
offend the morality of many people. The attitudinal differences between men and women 
may also mean that men, who are usually the perpetrators of sexual harassment, are less 
likely to find it immoral. However, I think that most people would feel that the actual 
consequences of sexual harassment, such as a reduction in confidence or a restriction of 
freedom, are immoral. I believe the real problem is that many people do not realise that 
sexual harassment can cause such results. 
59 Wilson, above n 19, 182. 
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I believe that the legislature needs to make a stand for public morality, and demonstrate 
that this form of oppression and harm is intolerable in this day and age. The legislature, 
after all, is not unfamiliar with instructing citizens on what is morally unacceptable, as is 
shown by the Crimes against Morality and Decency in the Crimes Act.60 
Current reporting problems in this area may be more to do with the lack of available 
protection and vindication than the belief that sexual harassment is acceptable. There will 
be fewer reporting problems if adequate legal protection, in the forms of criminal 
regulation and expanded civil remedies, is available. 
The criminal regulation of sexual harassment should not attract many reporting problems 
because one party wants the act to stop. Sexual harassment is different from crimes such 
as drug-related offences, where neither party may welcome such a cessation, or family 
violence, where family ties and pressures more strongly discourage reporting. 
However, as with acquaintance rape, there will often be little physical proof, and the 
victim's sexual history may be introduced as relevant evidence. 61 Therefore, victims may 
feel that they will be disbelieved or that they cannot endure relentless cross-examination. 
The diminished self esteem which can result from sexual harassment may even lead to 
victims believing that they deserved their ordeals. 
The use of written statements as evidence could possibly assuage the difficulty of such 
trials, thus encouraging victims to seek justice. Such statements could also offer a clearer 
6° Crimes Act 1961 ss 124-126. For example, section 124 criminalises the distribution and exhibition of 
indecent matter, although I would argue that public opinion on such criminalisation may well be divided. 
Note also the criminalisation of blasphemous libel in section 123, which is probably even more contentious 
and is very rarely enforced. 
61 Evidence Act 1908 s 23A. Note however that leave is required by the Judge. See E McDonald The 
Relevance of Her Prior Sexual (Mis) Conduct to His Belief in Consent: Syllogistic Reasoning and Section 
23A of the Evidence Act 1908 (1994) 10/2 Women's Studies Journal, 41. 
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explanation of the victim's perspective of the sexual harassment, thus assisting a judge in 
understanding the victim's viewpoint and fairly assessing the case. 
In any event, anticipated reporting difficulties did not prevent the criminalisation of 
underreported crimes such as acquaintance rape. Regardless of the possibility of 
reporting problems, the criminalisation of sexual harassment would send a strong 
message that it is publicly and legally unacceptable, and at least provide an avenue for 
victims to seek vindication. 
There may be difficulties in enforcing sexual harassment as both a criminal and a civil 
offence, as the identity of the perpetrator may not be known. This would be most likely 
to occur in a case of one public act of sexual harassment. It could be troublesome to 
obtain the identity of an abusive public bar patron, for example. However, as this can 
occur with most offences, it is an insufficient reason for denying the option of criminal 
sanctions. 
One can also anticipate difficulties with the police enforcement of sexual harassment as a 
crime. The education of the police on gender issues is arguably even more deficient than 
that of the judiciary. It is foreseeable that members of police will not consider sexual 
harassment as a sufficiently serious offence to necessitate the laying of charges. 
However, as police training must be more frequent and extensive than judicial training, 
guidelines and protocols could readily be introduced to enable police officers to 
sympathetically deal with sexual harassment complaints under the Act. 
The fact that criminalisation can restrict personal autonomy means that a balancing of 
rights is required. The difference in the perceptions of men and women regarding sexual 
harassment means that criminalisation could lead men to fear making advances in case 
they are unwanted and seen as intimidating. 
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However, a man's "right to ask" does not extend to a right to perform unwanted 
harassment. This is not freedom; it is the power of intimidation, and it cannot prevail 
against a woman's right to be free from this unwanted domination: 62 
[W]hile the elimination of inequality in society inevitably makes some people feel wronged 
- entailing, as it does, a reduction in the social status and privilege of those on the top of the 
hierarchy, regardless of whether they harbor personal hostility toward those beneath them -
that fact does not justify its perpetration. 
I believe that it is just as appropriate to criminalise sexual harassment as harassment 
such as stalking. With all types of harassment, a victim is subjected to unreasonable 
intimidation and can suffer serious harm. It is not sufficient to merely protect victims 
from sexual harassment. The tangible punishment of perpetrators is required to 
demonstrate the unacceptability of this sexual crime. 
II. Proposed Criminal Sexual Harassment Provision 
The existing mens rea requirement for criminal harassment under section 8 is intention to 
cause or recklessness towards causing the victim to reasonably fear for her or his safety. 
This is problematic where the gender differences in perceptions of a situation involving 
sexual harassment mean that the same view is not taken of the meaning of "safety". In 
many cases, the effect of the intimidation of sexual harassment is that victims perceive a 
real risk of sexual assault when, objectively and statistically, no such risk actually exists. 
Therefore, there are conceivable problems in consistently finding that victims in such 
situations reasonably feared for their safety under this provision. 
For sexual harassment cases, the threshold requirement of a fear for personal safety 
should be replaced by a substantial restriction of freedom due to the victim' s undermined 
personal dignity or humiliation. The mens rea requirement for criminal sexual 
62 Wall, above n 32, 235. 
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harassment should be satisfied if the offender intends to cause, or is reckless about 
causing, such a restriction of freedom by way of their sexual harassment. The 
recklessness limb should retain an element of reasonableness in regard to the victim's 
reaction to the harassment. While this may limit the judiciary's ability to recognise a 
victim's subjective response, an objective basis for punishment is desirable when a 
criminal record and attendant social stigma are at stake. 
This criminal sexual harassment could be implemented as follows: 
Every person commits an offence who sexually harasses another person in any case where -
a) The first-mentioned person intends that sexual harassment to cause a substantial 
restriction of that other person's freedom by -
i) Humiliating that other person; or 
ii) Undermining that other person ' s dignity ; or 
b) The first-mentioned person knows that the sexual harassment is likely, given the 
particular circumstances of that other person, to cause a substantial restriction of that 
other person ' s freedom by -
i) Humiliating that other person; or 
ii) Undermining that other person's dignity. 
This criminal sexual harassment provision could apply in cases where a victim IS 
constructively dismissed from employment or develops a mental illness from the sexual 
harassment. In such cases, major life decisions or disabilities are great restrictions on a 
victim's freedom, and criminal, public censure is required to demonstrate that this IS 
totally unacceptable. 
There may still be problems when the male-dominated judiciary applies the concept of 
reasonableness to this gendered harm. "[T]he goal of employing an ' objective' test that is 
unaffected by the judge' s (or any other) worldview and that is sufficiently general to 
apply to all people is simply an illusory one."63 However, as our legal system is heavily 
63 Wall, above n 32, 247 . 
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based on such objective standards, it is probably best to work within this scheme to 
gradually attain feminist progress. There are risks that radical changes would not be 
implemented or would provoke a public backlash. 
The Cunningham64 subjective recklessness standard is usually applied to recklessness 
provisions in New Zealand. The subjective recklessness test requires that an offender "has 
foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to take the 
risk of it".65 This test is not satisfied when the accused does not foresee a real possibility 
of harm before acting. This poses difficulties for sexual harassment cases in which the 
accused fails to consider, or considers but completely discounts, the possibility of a 
consequential restriction of the victim's freedom. As sexual access and power are the 
primary motives for sexual harassment, a perpetrator is unlikely to consider anyone's 
feelings but her or his own. Therefore, without an appreciation of at least some risk, the 
subjective recklessness standard will fail to catch sexual harassers. 
I believe that the Caldwell66 objective recklessness standard would be more appropriate 
for this provision. This standard extends the test to include an offender who "has not 
given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk". 67 However, a 
perpetrator who considered but discounted such a possibility would still not be caught 
unless any action was taken to minimise a perceived risk. 68 However, New Zealand 
courts have declined to embrace the objective standard, and even in England "the 
64 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396. 
65 R v Cunningham above n 64, 399 per Byrne J. 
66 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [ 1982] AC 341. 
67 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell above n 66, 354 per Diplock LJ. 
68 This situation may qualify as recklessness under Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v 
Shimmen (1986) 84 Cr App R 7. 
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importance of Caldwell is now diminishing." 69 Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect our 
courts to apply anything more extensive than the subjective recklessness standard.70 
69 Simester & Brookbanks, above n 58, 96. 
70 However, in section 128 of the Crimes Act 1961, the legislature has imposed the objective recklessness 
standard as to the lack of consent in the offence of sexual violation . See above, n 53 . 
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E) CONCLUSION 
The traditional patriarchy inherent in our culture means that the legal system has been 
slow to recognise harms against women. That women were seen as the "other" sex is 
evidenced by "the 1918 utterance of industrial psychologist Ordway Tead ... that the 
presence of women in the workplace was a sexual fringe benefit for male coworkers and 
supervisors. "71 
The legal claim of sexual harassment is relatively new, although the act itself is prevalent 
in daily life. Both the seriousness of sexual harassment and the reality of our patriarchal 
culture are generally not understood by society. This makes the adjudication of sexual 
harassment, a gendered harm, particularly problematic. 
The Harassment Act aims to adequately protect all victims of harassment and provide 
effective sanctions for breaches of harassment law. However, the Act fails to name 
sexual harassment as a distinct offence, and identifies specified acts of harassment which 
relate more to stalking than sexual harassment. While much stalking is sexually 
motivated, the Act neglects to characterise sexual harassment as an offence in its own 
right. A restraining order is the sole civil remedy for harassment, and the mens rea 
requirement for criminal harassment is unlikely to be applicable to most sexual 
harassment cases. 
I believe that the Act both fails to demonstrate that sexual harassment is a distinct, serious 
offence, and fails to provide effective sanctions by basically limiting sexual harassment 
remedies to restraining orders. 
71 K Segrave, The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 1600 to 1993 (McFarland & Co Inc, 
North Carolina, 1994) I. 
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I propose separate provisions to apply to sexual harassment claims under the Act, in the 
areas of specified acts, criminal harassment, and compensatory damages. 
Specified acts of sexual harassment must be identified to help focus an inquiry and reduce 
the possibility of judicial discretion. The substantive punishment of offenders is 
warranted because of the necessity of public denunciation and retribution for this 
"invisible" harm. Compensatory damages are required to adequately sanction 
perpetrators of civil harassment and empower victims. 
The criminalisation of sexual harassment is necessary because it causes real harm to both 
victims and society. The mens rea requirement for sexual harassment should be an 
intention to cause, or recklessness towards causing, a substantial restriction of the 
victim's freedom due to her or his humiliation or undermined dignity. 
Until societal attitudes change, and judicial education is guaranteed, victims of sexual 
harassment must fight an uphill battle in order to get their claims heard and rights 
enforced. I believe that the Harassment Act, in its sole focus on harassment, could have 
been the perfect means to recognise and publicly signal the seriousness of sexual 
harassment outside of the workplace. However, the failure to name sexual harassment as 
a distinct offence means that sexual harassment claims under the Act must fit within the 
provisions which were principally proposed for stalking offences. In this age of reputed 
equality, a public legislative statement is required to evince the unacceptability of sexual 
harassment, despite its current prevalence. 
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